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Abstract 
 
A conjecture of Laffer, which had considerable influence on fiscal doctrine, is that tax revenues of a 
Leviathan state eventually decrease when the tax rate exceeds a threshold value. We conduct a real effort 
experiment, in which a “worker” is matched with a non-working partner, to elicit the conditions under which 
a Laffer curve can be observed. We ran four different treatments by manipulating work opportunities and the 
power to tax. In the endogenous treatment, the non-working partner chooses a tax rate among the set of 
possibilities and receives the revenue generated by her choice and the worker’s effort response to this tax 
rate. In the exogenous treatment, the tax rate is randomly selected by the computer and the non-working 
partner merely receives the revenue from taxes. The Laffer curve phenomenon cannot be observed in the 
exogenous treatments, but arises in endogenous treatments. Tax revenues are then maximized at a 50% tax 
rate. We demonstrate that an “efficiency tax” model (with or without inequity aversion) falls short of 
predicting our experimental Laffer curve but an alternative model of social preferences provides a micro-
foundation for the latter. This new model endogenously generates a social norm of fair taxation at a 50% tax 
rate under asymmetric information about workers’ type. Taxpayers manage to enforce this norm by working 
less whenever it has been violated but do not systematically reward “kind” tax setters. Workers who 
maximize their expected wealth adjust work to the tax rate equitably so that tax revenues remain at a fair 
level. Workers who respond affectively to norm violations just refuse to work so that tax revenues are cut 
down. Workers endowed with higher work opportunities tend to respond more emotionally to unfair taxation 
in our experiment, which is consistent with the observed Laffer curve and with the history of tax revolts.   
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Résumé 
 
En 1974, Arthur Laffer lançait l’idée que les recettes fiscales d’un état Léviathan se mettent à décroître 
lorsque le taux d’imposition excède un certain seuil. Cette idée a exercé une grande influence sur la doctrine 
fiscale des dernières décennies. Dans la présente étude, nous procédons à une expérience avec effort réel 
dans laquelle un « travailleur » est apparié à un partenaire inactif. Le but de l’expérience est de dégager les 
conditions de validité de la prédiction de Laffer. Nous avons retenu quatre traitements en manipulant les 
opportunités de travail et le pouvoir de taxer. Dans les deux traitements endogènes (avec opportunité de 
travail faible et forte), le participant inactif choisit le niveau de taxe qui déterminera le revenu qu’il recevra 
du travail de son partenaire. Dans les deux traitements exogènes, le niveau de taxe est choisi aléatoirement 
par l’ordinateur, et les taxes perçues distribuées au partenaire inactif. La courbe de Laffer n’est pas 
observable dans les traitements exogènes, mais existe bien dans les traitements endogènes, particulièrement 
lorsque l’opportunité du travail est forte. La recette fiscale est maximum au taux de 50%. Nous démontrons 
qu’un modèle de « taxe d’efficience » (avec ou sans aversion à l’inégalité) ne parvient pas à prédire 
l’ensemble de ces résultats. En revanche, un modèle alternatif de préférences sociales procure des 
fondements microéconomiques à la courbe de Laffer. Ce nouveau modèle induit une norme sociale de juste 
taxation au taux de 50% sous condition d’information asymétrique sur les types de travailleurs. Les 
travailleurs taxés assurent le maintien de la norme en travaillant moins lorsqu’elle n’est pas respectée, mais 
ne récompensent pas les choix d’imposition « généreux ». Les travailleurs qui maximisent leur richesse 
attendue ajustent leur travail au taux de taxation de sorte que la recette fiscale ne s’écarte pas du niveau 
équitable. Les travailleurs, notamment ceux qui ont une forte opportunité de travail, réagissent plus souvent 
de manière émotionnelle aux violations de la norme en refusant de travailler, validant ainsi la courbe de 
Laffer et l’histoire des révoltes de contribuables.   
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1. Introduction 
 
             The “Laffer curve” is the proposition, attributed in 1974 to future Reagan’s advisor 
Arthur Laffer (Laffer 2004) by a Wall Street Journal columnist, that there is a unique 
optimal tax rate that maximizes revenue collection. If the tax level is set below this level, 
raising taxes (more specifically, marginal tax rates) will increase tax revenue. However, if 
the tax level is set above this level, then raising taxes will decrease tax revenue. The Laffer 
curve is based on the commonsense intuition that tax revenues are obviously zero if the tax 
rate is zero, and are also zero if the tax rate is equal to one, as rational agents would 
withdraw from the market to evade tax or consume untaxed leisure. This conjecture of 
Laffer had considerable influence on fiscal doctrine, and fuelled the “supply side 
economics” argument that tax cut would actually increase tax revenue if the government is 
operating on the right side of the curve.1  
Looking at the empirical literature on the effects of taxes on labor supply invites 
skepticism toward the Laffer conjecture (see Fortin and Lacroix (2002) for a recent 
survey). Indeed, many analysts conclude that net wage rates have little effect on the labor 
force participation and hours of work in employment of adult men, although women’s 
behavior is much more sensitive to net wages and to taxes. However, many studies have 
found that taxable income is much more responsive to tax changes than hours of work. In 
particular, high income taxpayers are always found to be very sensitive to increases in 
marginal tax rates because there are many ways for them to adjust to a tax increase like 
reducing their effort (not hours), changing the form of their compensation, switching to 
less taxed activities and avoiding tax. Natural experiments have become a popular method 
for assessing the impact of a tax policy change on taxable income (Lindsey 1987, Feldstein 
1995, Goldsbee1999, Sillamaa and Veal 2000). The 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US has 
been under special scrutiny since the marginal tax rate on the highest-income individuals 
fell from 50% to 28%.  
One obvious limitation of natural experiments is that conclusions drawn from a specific 
policy change are hard to generalize to the impact of another policy and context. The use 
of laboratory experiments in a controlled environment circumvents this difficulty at the 
cost of limiting the study to one particular, but hopefully important, aspect of behaviour. 
This methodology has been used by Swenson (1988), Sillamaa (1999) and Sutter and 
                                                          
1 Laffer (2004) does not claim credit for this idea, which had been anticipated at least by the Islamic scholar 
Ibn Khaldun in the 14th century, by the French economist Frédéric Bastiat in the 19th century, and by John 
Meynard Keynes.  
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Weck Hannemann (2003) to measure the effect of a wage tax on work in a real-effort 
experiment. We follow the same track to examine how people adjust their real work effort 
in response to tax rates, and we test whether a Laffer curve relates tax revenues and tax 
rates. However, our experiment allows a comparison of several treatments, which were 
considered in isolation by earlier studies. It also makes a number of simplifications, which 
will make the theoretical analysis more transparent.  
The main objective of this paper is to explore the conditions of emergence of a Laffer 
curve phenomenon in its simplest form through a controlled experiment, and to propose a 
theoretical micro-foundation for the latter. For this purpose, we abstract from the 
complexities of the tax system by focusing on a proportional income tax. This eliminates 
possibilities for substitution between activities and assets, which are partly responsible for 
the Laffer curve phenomenon in the highest-income groups (e.g., Feldstein 1995), and 
reduces the likelihood of finding a Laffer curve. We do not observe the latter in our 
simplified setting when tax rates are randomly imposed on a working taxpayer. However, 
we observe it in a Leviathan state condition in which an experimental tax setter in flesh 
and blood is given the power to maximize tax revenues to his own benefit. In a bilateral 
bargaining game like ours, tax revenues are then maximized at a 50% tax rate beyond 
which they decline, notably so for treatments with high work opportunities. We provide a 
theory of the formation of this social norm whose implications are confirmed by our 
experimental data.  
Participants are paired in the experiment. In each pair, one randomly selected participant is 
asked to choose and exert an effort, and the resulting output is taxed to the benefit of her 
partner. The working subjects in the different pairs are confronted with a set of four 
different tax rates (12%, 28%, 50% or 79%) and are asked to choose and perform a 
discrete number of real tasks conditional on the tax rate imposed on them.2 We ran four 
different treatments depending on work opportunities (a ceiling of 26 or 52 tasks allowed 
to the worker) and on the power to tax effectively given to the worker’s partner. In the 
endogenous treatment, the non-working partner chooses a tax rate among the set of 
possibilities and receives the revenue generated by her choice and the worker’s effort 
response to this tax rate. In the exogenous treatment, the computer randomly selects the tax 
rate and the non-working partner merely receives the revenue from taxes.  
                                                          
2 The intermediate values (28%, 50%) have been chosen to coincide with the marginal tax rates on the 
highest income group, respectively after and before the 1986 Tax Reform Act.  
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Benchmark predictions concerning the experiment are derived in section 2 from an 
“efficiency tax” version of Solow’s (1979) efficiency wage model. The “efficiency tax 
rate” predicted for the endogenous treatment is such that the tax rate-elasticity of worker’s 
effort is just -1. Put differently, it is the revenue-maximizing rate for which the tax rate 
elasticity of tax revenue is just zero. Our experimental design is presented in more detail in 
section 3, and the results of our study are given in section 4. A new micro-foundation for 
the Laffer curve emerges from further analysis of the data in subsequent sections by a 
comparison between the endogenous and exogenous treatments. We interpret the fact that 
tax rate elasticities of work are substantially negatively lower when tax rates are set by 
another subject in flesh and blood than by nature as evidence of effective punishment 
strategies whereby taxpayers signal and enforce the social norm of fair taxation on the tax 
setters. The Laffer curve is rationalized in our paper as a dynamic construct, first at the 
individual’s level, then at the aggregate level. The social norm of fair taxation is derived in 
section 5.  When workers’ types (empathy, risk aversion) are not observable by tax setters, 
a 50% tax rate is recognized as a social norm that workers of all types wish to enforce on 
tax setters in bilateral games. Since the social norm is common knowledge, punishment of 
norm violators is also common knowledge.  Two sorts of punishment arise in section 6. On 
one hand, workers who are unfairly treated but keep their self-control merely seek 
compensation for their loss through an equitable punishment (Adams 1963). On the other 
hand, workers who feel so unfairly treated that they lose control respond affectively and 
impulsively (Zajonc 1980) by simply refusing to work. Equitable punishment entails a 
unitary negative elasticity of work to tax rates, very much like the benchmark prediction. 
However, a substantial fraction of workers reacted emotionally to unfair taxation in the 
endogenous treatment with high opportunities for work, which caused the average tax rate 
elasticity of work to fall below -1 as tax rates increase over 50%. Finally, we demonstrate 
that it is not equitable to reward a “kind” tax setter who cut tax rates below the norm. The 
asymmetry of equitable rewards and punishments is responsible for a dynamic Laffer 
curve phenomenon, even if emotional rewards are no weaker than emotional punishments. 
Conclusion and implications of our analysis for fiscal policy and the history of tax revolts 
can be found in section 7. 
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2. Benchmark predictions 
 
The game studied here is a two-player sequential move game that consists of two 
stages. The endogenous treatment reflects a situation analogous to that described by 
efficiency wage theory. The first player A (the “tax setter”) has the power to set the “tax 
rate” t∈[0,1] levied on all units of output that the second player B (the “worker”) wishes to 
produce in the second stage of the game. It is possible to view the tax setter, either as a 
non-competitive firm sharing marginal revenue with its employees, or as a Leviathan state 
capturing a share of earned incomes through taxes. The worker’s effort or “work” e∈[0,θ] 
is measured in efficiency units and equated with output. Endowed leisure time of workers 
is normalized to 1. The worker derives utility from her “wage” and saved 
leisure , and disutility from work effort e. We define as the net disutility of work 
and reduction of leisure time and assume that utility is additive in wage and work 
et)1( −
e−1 )(eC
W =  –     et)1( − )(eC )0,0( >′′>′ CC  (1) 
The tax setter picks up the revenues from the tax conditional on the worker’s effort 
R =  (2) te
The standard prediction of this game under the assumptions of common knowledge of 
rationality, selfishness and perfect information is derived by backward induction. For 
convenience, work and tax rates are treated as continuous variables. The worker, who is 
the second mover, chooses her utility (1)-maximizing effort conditional on the tax rate. For 
an interior optimum, the f.o.c. writes 
0)(')1( =−− eCt                                                                                                                (3) 
Solving for e, the Nash equilibrium is 
                                                                                                                                 (4) )(* tge =
Equation (4) describes the labor supply response to linear wage taxation, which would be 
observed if tax rates were exogenous.3 This condition is described by our exogenous 
treatment. However, in the endogenous treatment, the tax setter will choose the tax rate, 
which maximizes her revenue (2) conditional on the worker’s effort function (4), assuming 
subgame perfection. The equilibrium tax rate necessarily lies strictly between 0 and 1 and 
is given by the f.o.c. 
                                                          
3 Our formulation is standard but has the undesirable feature of precluding positive tax rate elasticities of 
effort. Since we don’t find positive elasticities empirically and all the qualitative conclusions of our analysis 
extend to the more general formulation of the worker’s utility function )()1,)1(( eCeetwVW −−−+= , 
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0)(')( =+ ttgtg  (5) 
This condition is analogous to the Solow condition (Solow 1979) in efficiency wage 
theory. The “efficiency tax rate” is such that the tax rate-elasticity of worker’s effort is just 
-1 or, equivalently, that the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is just zero. This important 
prediction will be tested experimentally.  
In order to visualize which levels of taxation this condition implies, we further specify the 
convex cost of effort function as aeeC δ=)(  )1,0( >> aδ . The equilibrium tax rate is then 
a
at 1* −=  and the equilibrium effort is 1
1
2 )
1(* −= a
a
e δ . The equilibrium tax rate is positive 
but lower than one-half if , and greater than one-half if . 21 << a 2>a
These benchmark predictions can be modified by introducing fairness as inequity aversion, 
following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). This is a rather 
natural extension to think of, since our game is a variant of the Ultimatum Bargaining 
Game (Güth et al. 1982) and of the Gift Exchange Game (Fehr, Kirschteiger, Riedl, 1993; 
Falk and Gächter, 2002), which have been explained by inequity aversion. In this 
approach, players derive utility from the costs and returns of their actions (private 
component) and from the negative and positive gaps, which occur between themselves 
(social component). Positive returns are always good, and gaps are always bad even though 
disadvantageous inequity would be felt more strongly than advantageous inequity. We 
show in the appendix how the benchmark predictions are modified by inequity aversion 
when tax rates are endogenous. Efficiency tax rates will be lower than the benchmark 
predictions if tax setters have a weak aversion to advantageous inequity, and fall to zero 
(or minimum) if tax setters have a strong aversion to advantageous inequity. In addition, 
the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue no longer takes a negative value in the endogenous 
treatment but, rather, lies between 0 and 1 if tax setters have an aversion for advantageous 
inequity. The elasticity of tax revenue gets closer to 1 as inequity aversion rises. These 
results offer the way to discriminate between the two models.  
 
3. Experimental Design  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants are paired and the role played 
by each subject as a tax receiver (subject A) or as a taxpayer (subject B) is randomly 
                                                                                                                                                                                
where w is the individual’s endowed wealth and V is quasi-concave, we adopted the simpler formulation for 
exposition.  
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chosen. The same roles and matching are maintained during all the experiment. Subject B, 
the taxpayer, produces an effort by performing a task, which consists of decoding a 
number from a grid of letters that appears on the computer screen. In the endogenous 
treatment, subject A, the tax receiver, first chooses the tax rate that she wants to impose on 
the number of tasks completed by B. B responds to the tax rate by choosing then the 
number of tasks that she wants to complete among a set of four possibilities 12, 28, 50 and 
79%.4  Once B has decided how many tasks she wishes to perform, a first number appears, 
and B fills in the letter that ought to correspond to this number. Correct answers only are 
remunerated and taxed. The first period is completed when the last task from the number 
chosen by B is achieved. A is then invited to submit another tax rate to B and the game 
continues. This treatment evokes a context of forced taxation, in which A is the decisive 
member of a pressure group or a winning majority who acquired the power to tax B to her 
exclusive benefit. In the exogenous treatment, the tax receiver A has no power to set the 
tax rate, which is randomly chosen by the computer among the same set of four 
possibilities that was used in the endogenous treatment.5 While B is working, A is supplied 
with magazines and computer games to keep her waiting until the end of the session. B is 
aware that a randomly determined share of her own earnings will be transferred to a 
passive partner and she must decide how many tasks she wants to perform.6  Not only is 
A’s behavior more active in the endogenous treatment than in the exogenous treatment but 
this applies to B as well. In the exogenous treatment, there is no room for either non-
strategic behavior (intentions) or strategic behavior of players, while both types of 
behavior may be present in the endogenous treatment. For both the endogenous and 
exogenous treatments, we design two treatments, which differ by the work ceilings of 
subjects B, i.e. the maximum number of tasks that they are allowed to perform in each 
period. Work opportunities are limited to 26 tasks in the low effort treatment, and to 52 
                                                          
4 Our endogenous treatment differs from the experimental design of Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) on 
several details. The latter used the strategy method in which taxpayers first indicate their choice of effort for 
various predetermined levels of taxation and commit themselves to supply the reported effort once another 
player has chosen his preferred rate of taxation. They also required that the marginal income decrease with 
the number of tasks, which may be an unnecessary complication since the marginal disutility of effort, which 
cannot be controlled in a real effort experiment, is likely to increase anyway. The marginal income was kept 
constant in our design. Finally, Sutter and Weck-Hahnemann limited the game to only two periods and asked 
participants to vote on the upper limit of taxation in the second round. The effective tax rate was determined 
by the median vote. We are not concerned with voting in this experiment because we focus on the micro-
foundations of the Laffer curve in a bilateral bargaining framework. 
5 Our exogenous treatment differs from the experimental design of Swenson (1988) on several points. We 
keep four possibilities (12%, 28%, 50%, 79%) instead of five (12%, 28%, 50%, 73%, 87%) and measure the 
total effect of tax changes rather than the pure substitution effect.  
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tasks in the high effort treatment. For brevity, we shall sometimes call these two treatments 
the “low effort” and the “high effort” treatment. The monetary gains (leisure) of both A 
and B are positively (negatively) related to the number of correct tasks performed by Bs. 
However, taxation creates a conflict between As and Bs since it is beneficial to tax 
receivers and harmful to tax payers. The social marginal return for a correct task takes the 
constant value of 100 ECU (experimental currency units). In Table 1, we summarize the 
four treatments of the experiment: 
 
Table 1. Experimental treatments 
 Tax rate  
 
 
Work opportunities 
random: exogenous 
treatment 
chosen: endogenous 
treatment 
26: low Exo26 (23 pairs) Endo26 (36 pairs)7
52: high Exo52 (23 pairs) Endo52 (22 pairs) 
 
 
Each experimental session is constituted of a number of repetitions of the game. One tax 
rate is determined at the beginning of each game but, following Swenson (1988) and 
Silamma (1999), subjects B were allowed to allocate their total work response to a game’s 
tax rate between three periods. This procedure is supposed to reduce errors and to avoid a 
restart effect.8 To also avoid end-game effects, subjects were not told how many repetitions 
of the game they would have to play. In effect, they all played six repetitions of the game 
over 18 periods. Since the length of each period varies according to the number of tasks 
chosen by B, all pairs of players did not necessarily end the experiment at the same time. 
This procedure allows Bs to trade-off work and leisure.  
The experimental sessions were run at the Lub3CE-CIRANO laboratory in Montreal. In 
the lab, curtains isolated participants in their respective computer booth. The experiment 
was computerized using the REGATE program developed by Romain Zeiliger at GATE in 
Lyon.9 Most subjects were students. No subject had participated to previous experiments 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 Although As are passive in the exogenous treatment, their presence was important to maintain the same 
structure in both treatments and to show Bs that the tax drawn from their income was not money burning.  
7 The addition of new sessions with 52 tasks led us to reduce the number of participants in those sessions 
relative to the initial 26 task sessions.  
8 The idea of a restart treatment has been also discussed by Andreoni (1988) in the context of voluntary 
contributions to public goods.  
9 zeiliger@gate.cnrs.fr 
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of a similar type. Once the 18 periods of play were over for a pair of players, both 
participants were able to leave the lab and were paid privately. On average, a session lasted 
120 minutes, including initial instructions and payment of subjects, and a subject earned on 
average Can $ 35 including the show-up fee. 
 
4. Experimental results: Testing the benchmark predictions 
 
We first describe the average behavior of tax setters A (in the endogenous 
treatments only) and that of workers B in all treatments. Then we account for the dynamics 
of the behavioral response of workers to changes in tax rates, and observe whether subjects 
responded more strongly to intentional than to random changes. Finally, we describe tax 
revenues and their elasticity to tax rates, and elicit the existence conditions for a Laffer 
curve.  
 
4.1. Average behavior  
            Figure 1 describes the frequency with which tax setters A have chosen among the 
four possible tax rates in the two endogenous treatments. Very similar patterns of choice 
can be observed for the low effort treatment (endo 26) and the high effort treatment (endo 
52). According to a Mann-Whitney test, there are no significant differences between the 
two treatments. A majority of subjects shared income in two halves with a non-negligible 
number who chose the 79% tax rate. Very few opted for tax rates lower than 50%. This 
result does not refute the benchmark prediction of a unique efficiency tax rate under the 
auxiliary assumption that there is no wide dispersion in the cost of effort function. Since 
tax rates rarely fall below 50%, advantageous inequity aversion, if any, should be weak for 
most subjects in our experiment.   
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Figure 1.  Frequency of choice of tax rates by tax setters 
in the endogenous treatments 
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Figures 2a and 2b show that “workers” B always reduce their level of effort and output, 
measured by the number of correct tasks, when tax rates increase. This reduction of effort 
is strongest for the endogenous treatment and high work opportunities. A large majority of 
subjects perform the maximum number of tasks when tax rates are low (12%, 28%). The 
percentage of such high performers declines at a 50% tax rate, and even falls to zero in the 
endogenous treatment when tax rates peak at 79%. Average work falls from 23.3 to 18.7 
tasks, when a maximum of 26 tasks can be achieved, as exogenous tax rates increase from 
12% to 79%; and from 46.2 to 26.8 under the same conditions when the maximum 
allowance is 52 tasks. According to a Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test, in the exogenous 
treatments work is significantly higher at the 5% significance level, both with a 12% and a 
28% tax rate than with a 79% tax rate. However, work reductions appear even stronger in 
the endogenous treatments. In the low effort condition, average work then falls from a high 
of 25.2 tasks at a 12% tax rate to a low of 12.6 at a 79% tax rate. And, in the high effort 
condition, average work falls from a high of 49.2 at a 12% tax rate to a low of 17.3 tasks at 
a 79% tax rate.  
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Figure 2a. Average work by tax rate (range [0,26]) 
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Figure 2b. Average work by tax rate (range [0,52]) 
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4.2. The dynamical response of workers to changes in tax rates 
                Figures 3a and 3b indicate the dynamical response of workers B to changes in 
tax rates, respectively in the low effort and the high effort treatment.  
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Figure 3a. First differences in work with first differences in tax rates 
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Figure 3b. First differences in work with first differences in tax rates (52 tasks) 
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These figures elicit the tax responsiveness of work by measuring how the first difference in 
work responds to the first difference in tax rates.10 We observe that tax changes always 
trigger-off work responses in the same direction. Figures 3a and 3b also allow direct 
                                                          
10 We take the average work during the three periods of one game.  
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comparison of tax responsiveness of work whether tax changes were intentional or not. Tax 
responsiveness should remain unaffected by the intentionality of tax changes according to 
our benchmark predictions including the modified version with inequity aversion. However, 
workers systematically overreacted when tax changes had been decided by a tax setter in 
flesh and blood. This result clearly refutes the benchmark predictions. The difference of 
responses for a given tax change between the two treatments is often large, and increasing in 
the magnitude of tax changes and of work opportunities.  
We can add precision to these findings by running an OLS regression of the first difference 
in work against the first difference in tax rates. Results for the four treatments are reported in 
table 3. The coefficient of tax changes in the first row measures the sensitivity of work to a 
tax on wages.  In addition to tax changes, we added an interaction term of the latter with a 
dummy variable taking a value of one if tax rates have increased and zero otherwise. In the 
second column, we also added a number of control variables that describe the game played 
(two last games) and the player (average productivity in the task, age, former participation to 
an experiment, gender, degree and apparent risk-aversion).11 The regressions demonstrate 
that an increase and an equal decrease in tax rates produce symmetrical effects since the 
interaction term is never significant. They also confirm that tax responsiveness is strongly 
increasing in work opportunities, which is consistent with the fact that highest-income 
individuals are particularly sensitive to tax changes. Furthermore, tax responsiveness seems 
to be exacerbated by the possibility to identify the tax receiver with a person in flesh and 
blood who intentionally set the rate of transfer to his exclusive benefit. We believe that this 
is a new and important finding that requires explanation. Finally, looking at the second 
column, we observe that, with a single exception, control variables are never significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. We interpret this result as evidence that (prior) tax 
changes have a causal effect (in Granger’s sense) on work changes.   
                                                     
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The “two last games” variable is a dummy taking value one in the two last games and zero otherwise. It 
might capture uncontrolled end-game behavior of players and fatigue.    
The player’s productivity in the experimental task is obtained by dividing the total number of correct tasks by 
the time spent on these tasks. It captures the player’s task-specific ability.  
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Table 3. OLS regression of first differences in work by treatment 
 Random tax rate 
(Exogenous) 
Chosen tax rate 
(Endogenous) 
Variable 26 tasks 52 tasks 26 tasks 52 tasks 
Tax rate change -0,0613 
(-2,25) 
-0,0540 
(-1,9) 
-0,3106 
(-4,23) 
-0,3359 
(-4,23) 
-0,3609 
(-7,13) 
-0,3632 
(-6,8) 
-0,7126 
(-6,64) 
-0,7202 
(-6,28) 
Tax rate change x 
Tax rate increases 
(dummy) 
-0,0685 
(-1,05) 
-0,0878 
(-1,29) 
0,0542 
(0,31) 
0,1130 
(0,6) 
0,0193 
(0,26) 
0,0213 
(0,27) 
0,1257 
(0,74) 
0,1322 
(0,7) 
Age   0,1100 
(0,57) 
 -0,2008 
(-0,64) 
 0,0541 
(0,56) 
 0,1259 
(0,22) 
Male   -0,5711 
(-0,41) 
 -2,8507 
(-0,86) 
 0,5569 
(0,41) 
 -4,1336 
(-1,12) 
Graduation  -0,0317 
(-0,02) 
 -0,9016 
(-0,25) 
 -0,2658 
(-0,18) 
 1,4424 
(0,34) 
Previous participation  0,7683 
(0,6) 
 2,2831 
(0,69) 
 0,2760 
(0,19) 
 1,2118 
(0,38) 
Risk aversion   -2,1695 
(-1,45) 
 0,7100 
(0,22) 
 -0,4324 
(-0,33) 
 2,0834 
(0,5) 
Productivity  0,2789 
(1,46) 
 0,0536 
(0,06) 
 -0,0373 
(-0,42) 
 -0,0479 
(-0,07) 
Last two games   -2,8385 
(-2,61) 
 2,2823 
(0,75) 
 0,3944 
(0,34) 
 -2,7353 
(-0,92) 
Constant 1,1710 
(0,96) 
-2,9785 
(-0,47) 
-2,6750 
(-0,81) 
0,5246 
(0,04) 
0,0227 
(0,03) 
-1,2230 
(-0,3) 
-0,9223 
(-0,56) 
-1,7826 
(-0,11) 
2R   
0,2463 
 
0,271 
 
0,3390 
 
0,3119 
 
0,4305 
 
0,4117 
 
0,4227 
 
0,4004 
Number of 
observations 
115 115 115 115 180 180 110 110 
Note: t values are in parentheses. 
 
 
4.3. Tax revenue and the Laffer curve 
                          
Figure 4 shows the variation of tax revenue with tax rates in the endogenous 
treatments. The tax revenue increases up to the 50% tax rate and decreases thereafter, most 
visibly so in the high effort treatment. Thus, we obtain a Laffer curve and confirm the 
experimental findings of Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) in this respect. However, if 
we move to the exogenous treatments, the tax revenue increases steadily with tax rates in 
the observed range (not shown). No Laffer curve can be found then within reasonable 
bounds for tax rates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Besides, subjects were classified as “risk-averse” if they preferred a $5 show-up fee to a lottery ticket that 
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Figure 4. Tax revenue by tax rates for the endogenous treatments 
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In order to characterize the Laffer curve more precisely, we run a Tobit regression on tax 
revenues as a function of tax rate dummies for the 4 treatments. The results reported in 
Table 4 obviously do not support the existence of a Laffer curve whenever tax rates are 
exogenous. The latter appears only in a weak (or degenerate) sense for endogenous rates in 
the low effort treatment (26 tasks) insofar tax revenue reaches a maximum at a 50% tax 
rate but remains approximately constant thereafter. Finally, the Laffer curve emerges 
strikingly in the endogenous-high effort treatment (52 tasks) since tax revenue reaches a 
high peak at the 50% tax rate and falls to non-significant values both at lower and higher 
tax rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
gave them a 50% chance to get $11 and nothing otherwise. The lottery was drawn at the end of the session. 
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Table 4. Determinants of tax revenue 
 
 Random tax rate 
(exogenous) 
Chosen tax rate 
(endogenous) 
 26 tasks 52 tasks 26 tasks 52 tasks 
Rate 28 345,17 
(5,62) 
580,16 
(3,78) 
416,44 
(2,49) 
451,83 
(0,87) 
Rate 50 745,45 
(12,15) 
1077,07 
(7,01) 
767,57 
(5,38) 
1349,24 
(3,08) 
Rate 79 1 289,90 
(20,69) 
1628,21 
(10,57) 
710,21 
(4,79) 
471,83 
(1,06) 
Constant 
 
272,20 
(6,31) 
547,66 
(5,08) 
302,22 
(2,20) 
590,0 
(1,38) 
Log Likelihood -2815,01 -3175,15 -4266,17 -2772,76 
Number of 
observations  
Censored  to 0 
Censored to       
2054 (4108) 
               
 
414 
5 
 
41 
 
414 
19 
 
25 
 
648 
71 
 
(64) 
 
396 
67 
 
(22) 
 
Note: t values are in parentheses  
 
Table 5. Elasticity of tax revenue to tax rates 
 
 Random tax rate 
 (exogenous) 
Chosen tax rate 
 (endogenous) 
 26 tasks 52 tasks 26 tasks 52 tasks 
12η  0,702 0.574 0.654 0.181 
12,28η = 20η  0.739 0.565 0.629 0.363 
28η  0.775 0.556 0.604 0.545 
28,50η = 39η  0.825 0.543 0.569 0.795 
50η  0.857 0.567 0.279 0.033 
50,79η = 64,5η  0.898 0.598 -0.104 -0.973 
79η  0.939 0.629 -0.487 -1.978 
The unconditional expectations are predicted from the regressions on tax revenues given 
in Table 4. Elasticities are computed from estimates of and at two adjacent 
tax rates (e.g., 12 and 28%), at the three mean points (20, 39 and 64.5%), by the formula: 
1EQ 2EQ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
/
/ / 2
EQ EQ EQ EQ
T T T T
/ 2⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
. The three mid-point elasticities were then extrapolated 
linearly to the four tax rates. 
 
 
Coefficients exhibited in table 4 are then converted into elasticity values of tax revenue for 
various tax rates. The computed elasticity values are reported in table 5. They are always 
positive and fairly constant if tax rates were set randomly. The picture is totally different if 
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tax rates are set intentionally. Then, the elasticity of tax revenue is positive at lower-than-
fifty percent tax rates and turns suddenly null or negative above this threshold. A strongly 
negative elasticity obtains in the high effort treatment.  
To sum up, the Laffer curve is strongly suggested on our experimental data by a 
comparison between the endogenous and exogenous treatments. Clearly, the tax rate 
elasticity of tax revenue lies between 0 and 1 (even between 0.5 and 1 on our dataset) 
when a computer randomly selects tax rates, but falls significantly to 0 and below in both 
low effort and high effort treatments when tax rates are chosen by another subject in flesh 
and blood. The efficiency tax model does not accomplish a bad job since it manages to 
predict that tax rates should be heavily concentrated at their efficiency value and the tax 
rate elasticity of tax revenue should just equal 0 in the endogenous treatments. However, it 
cannot predict that the observed efficiency tax rate be close or equal to one-half, or that the 
tax rate elasticity of tax revenue may become strictly negative. By extrapolation of the 
estimated values, the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue computed from the exogenous 
treatments would suggest an efficiency tax rate derived from the benchmark model well 
above 79% and probably close to one, therefore much too high to fit the data. Results from 
the endogenous treatments refute even more the inequity aversion modification of this 
model since the latter predicts smaller efficiency tax rates than the benchmark predictions, 
and a tax rate elasticity of tax revenue between 0 and 1 if tax setters have an aversion to 
advantageous inequity.  
In the next section, we develop a new dynamic micro-foundation for the Laffer curve that 
can predict all of our experimental results. We interpret the fact that the tax rate elasticity 
of tax revenue be substantially negatively lower when tax rates are set by another subject 
in flesh and blood than by nature as evidence of effective punishment strategies whereby 
taxpayers signal and enforce the social norm of fair taxation on the tax setters.12
 
 
5. The social norm of fair taxation: 
5a. Determining prior intentions and normative expectations of players: 
                                                           
12 If taxpayers were unable to conceive forward-looking strategies, they would quickly learn their partner’s 
type (fair or selfish) and comply with it, since the same pairs of partners are matched for an indefinite 
number of games in our endogenous treatments. Given this fact, even fair tax setters would be tempted to 
take advantage of their partner’s myopia under asymmetric information about types and reveal a selfish type. 
Obviously, they don’t.  
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          The efficiency tax model is unable to explain why the observed efficiency tax rate 
should be just 50%, why the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is strictly negative in one 
treatment and why workers’ behavior differs so much between exogenous and endogenous 
treatments. Results from the endogenous treatments also refute the inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) modification of the model since the latter 
predicts that the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue should lie between 0 and 1 in the 
endogenous treatment if tax setters have an aversion to advantageous inequity. Since we 
cannot rely solely on the benchmark efficiency tax model or on a social preference model 
with inequity aversion to make sense of our experimental data, we may turn to an 
intention-based reciprocity model (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). 
However, these models have serious deficiencies in their present state because they don’t 
answer the basic question: “How can B read A’s intentions?” We answer this question here 
with the cognitive approach developed by Lévy-Garboua, Meidinger and Rapoport (2004: 
sections 5-6), which reformulates the psychological mechanisms of social cognition in the 
terms of social choice theory. Prior intentions of players are assimilated to their normative 
expectations. Moreover, the latter are shown for our experimental setting to be common to 
all players or to a specific group of players. Thus, they are common knowledge and 
constitute a social norm.  
We first move on to the determination of prior intentions of players in the 
endogenous treatments of our taxation game, by defining the prior social preference of 
rational players before the game starts. Forward-looking subjects anticipate that they will 
be playing either role (A or B) during the whole session (partner treatment) with an equal 
probability. Although they make a choice for several successive games, rational players 
must plan a constant behavior over all future games before the game starts, since they 
possess exactly the same information on all future periods. Therefore, we may assume a 
single game to determine the prior social preference.  
Let us further assume for the time being that the subject believes her unknown partner to 
be similar to self (in-group condition). Although she will control either taxation or work in 
reality but not both, she can imagine, before the game starts, that her similar partner would 
make the same choice than herself of the behavior that she controls. Thus she maximizes 
her state-dependent expected utility by imagining herself either in the A state or in the B 
state and by projecting her own characteristics (initial wealth, VNM utility function, cost 
of effort) onto her unknown, but similar, partner 
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Lemma 1: 
In the in-group condition, a 50% tax rate is a social norm for risk-averse partners. This 
norm is invariant to work opportunities θ. 
Proof:  
We calculate the two first-order derivatives of (11) 
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We first rule out the zero effort condition since all subjects have agreed to participate to the 
experiment. From now on,  is assumed everywhere for work intentions. Hence, the taxation 
optimum under perceived homogeneity of participants is easily derived from the first expression 
under concavity of the VNM utility function:
0≠e
2
1* =t .□ 
 
The optimal tax rate under perceived homogeneity of players or empathy can serve as a 
social norm for risk-averse players because it is independent from individual 
characteristics (initial wealth, risk aversion, cost of effort). Therefore, rational players are 
aware of prior intentions of their partners and can tacitly coordinate their own decisions. 
Furthermore, this norm does not vary with work opportunities. It is worth noticing that the 
social norm prescribes equalization of earnings, not of utility. Only marginal utilities of 
wealth are equalized, and the worker gets no compensation for his work. This result is a 
well-known consequence of state-dependent EU (Cook and Graham 1977). Players prefer 
to be tax setters than workers and take no coverage against the risk of becoming workers 
when they are unable to exchange this loss on markets.  
Let us now assume more generally that players have limited empathy or perceive 
heterogeneity in the sense that they will be confronted to a “similar” partner (in-group 
condition) with probability λ ( )10 ≤≤ λ or to a “dissimilar” partner (out-group condition) 
with probability 1-λ. Moreover, they have an equal chance of playing either A or B. In the 
out-group condition, they are entitled to set the tax rate if they play A and their partner 
then decides how much to work; however, if they play B, they take whatever tax rate their 
partner has chosen and decide how much to work given this tax rate. Letting, in the out-
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group condition, t designate the tax rate set exogenously by the partner and e the 
exogenous effort of the partner, we write the state-dependent EU: 
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If players believe that no partner can be like them (i.e. 0=λ ) and behave selfishly, they 
will start the game with no prior work intention and just choose their amount of work 
given the tax rate as they become workers. This is the situation described by the 
benchmark model. However, as soon as players believe that some of their potential 
partners are like them (i.e. 0>λ ), players will start the game with a prior work intention. 
The latter is derived by maximizing (12) with respect to e and t under quantity constraints. 
Since work intentions only arise in the in-group condition, the two f.o.c. relating to work 
that derive from (11) and (12) respectively yield the same result for all positive values of λ. 
Thus work intentions are invariant to perceived heterogeneity for non-selfish players. 
Furthermore, prior tax rates also exhibit a general pattern described by the following 
proposition.  
Lemma 2: 
Before the game starts, no risk-averse player expects the tax rate to be smaller than one-
half even though she perceives heterogeneity.  
Proof: 
Once again, 0, ≠ee are assumed. The first derivative of (12) with respect to t yields: 
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∂ λλ . 
From the latter, we derive: 0)(
2
1)1()1,21( >+′−=∂
<=∂ etwUe
t
tEU λλ , which demonstrates 
that the taxation optimum under perceived heterogeneity is greater than one-half. After allowing 
for discrete choice of tax rates and the special case of perceived homogeneity )1( =λ , we get the 
general proposition. □ 
 
Since tax rates are discrete in our experiment and only take two values no smaller than 
one-half, the optimal tax rate is one-half for small-perceived heterogeneity and equal to 
0.79 for great-perceived heterogeneity or selfishness. It is also likely to increase with work 
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opportunities if partial risk aversion is smaller than one, as usually postulated.13 The 
optimal tax rate is no longer a common prior as it now depends on individual 
characteristics of players. However, it still defines the “normative expectation” of each 
player.  
 
5b. Social norm of fair taxation and the micro-Laffer curve: 
As soon as roles have been permanently assigned to players, each participant will seek to 
maximize her own utility. Tax setters (A) are essentially concerned by tax revenues R, and 
workers (B) are concerned by their own disposable income net of the disutility of work W. 
In the benchmark model, R is given by (1) and W is given by (2). A chooses the tax rate 
which maximizes  given her own anticipation of B’s effort. B chooses the 
effort that maximizes
At ))(( tetE BA
Be )()1( eCet BA −−  conditional on the value of . If the benchmark 
prediction were true, workers’ behavior would be identical in the endogenous and 
exogenous treatments. Hence, the negative elasticity of tax revenue in the endogenous 
treatment relative to the exogenous treatment, which is the essence of the Laffer curve, 
requires further explanation. We contend that an obvious deficiency of the benchmark 
model is that it is static while the Laffer curve reveals the prevalence of dynamic 
strategies: signaling and punishment strategies on behalf of workers and reputation-
building strategies on behalf of tax setters.  
At
If workers have a prior social preference on entering the game, they must have a normative 
expectation for the tax rate, as we explained in the previous subsection. Since the tax rate 
that was chosen by A can be different from B’s normative expectation, B will experience 
surprises. Observing a tax rate in excess of one’s norm is an unpleasant surprise, which 
causes a feeling of outcome dissatisfaction, and observing a tax rate below the norm is a 
pleasant surprise, which causes satisfaction (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 2004). Bad 
and good surprises generate a potential for dynamic strategies of players, like the 
punishment of norm violators by unsatisfied workers and the reward of kind tax setters by 
satisfied workers. How effective will these dynamic strategies be? This is the point that we 
                                                           
13 If partner’s work, e , increases with work opportunities, 
2
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>0. The term in brackets is equal to one minus the partial risk aversion 
coefficient calculated for the tax revenues expected from a dissimilar worker who is charged a 50% tax rate.  
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now have to examine. The main assumption that we make in the sequel of the paper is the 
following. 
 
Assumption: 
The tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is positive when tax rates are exogenous and do not 
exceed 50%. 
 
This assumption is consistent with our observation (table 5) that the measured elasticity of 
tax revenue in the exogenous treatment is 0.857 (0.939) in the low effort treatment and 
0.567 (0.629) in the high effort treatment for a 50% (79%) tax rate. Consequently, tax 
setters have an incentive to set the tax rate above one-half since this would increase their 
revenue. In our experiment, they would have an incentive to opt for a 79% tax rate. Such 
tax rate would fit the normative expectation of the most selfish workers and cause 
dissatisfaction to others. However, even selfish (or risk-loving) workers would stand to 
gain from lower taxation. If it is common knowledge that no risk-averse player expects tax 
rates to be lower than one-half (lemma 2), those workers whose normative expectation 
exceeds one-half would benefit from exploiting the informational asymmetry on type 
(empathy, risk aversion) and pretend that they, too, expected a 50% tax rate. Consequently, 
all workers would want to enforce the social norm of a 50% tax rate, whether the latter 
does truly reflect their idiosyncratic normative expectation or not.  
Proposition 1: 
If lemma 2 is common knowledge and types (empathy, risk aversion) are not observable by 
tax setters, a 50% tax rate is recognized as a social norm that workers of all types wish to 
enforce on tax setters.    
 
A direct confirmation of lemma 2 and proposition 1 is provided by a comparison of choice 
of tax rates by tax setters in the first game and subsequent games. Under perceived 
heterogeneity, we showed (lemma 2) that the optimal tax rate is one-half for small-
perceived heterogeneity and equal to 0.79 for great-perceived heterogeneity or selfishness. 
We expect this situation to reflect choices of tax setters in the first game, that is, before 
they could experience the worker’s response to their own move, insofar most subjects 
don’t reason too far ahead.  Furthermore, we showed that the optimal tax rate is likely to 
increase with work opportunities if partial risk aversion is smaller than one, as usually 
postulated. That is, the first choice should be more biased toward the 79% rate in the high 
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effort treatment than in the low effort treatment. This is exactly what can be seen on figure 
5. Thus, we have reasons to suspect that subjects have limited empathy or perceive 
heterogeneity. However, if types are unobservable, proposition 1 states that workers should 
wish to enforce the 50% social norm on tax setters by punishing norm violators. Indeed, 
the comparison between figure 1 and figure 5 demonstrates that most tax setters comply 
with the social norm of equal sharing of income in subsequent games.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of choice of tax rates by tax setters in the first game 
of endogenous treatments 
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6. Punishment of norm violators: 
           Rational workers will have the power to enforce a 50% tax rate if two conditions are 
met: (i) tax setters lose revenues whenever they increase tax rates above one-half; (ii) 
workers do not lose from punishing norm violations. Since a 50% tax rate is recognized as 
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a social norm, it is common knowledge that observed punishments in one game would be 
repeated under the same conditions in all future games. Therefore, a tax setter who 
currently loses revenues after being punished once for violating the 50% norm is sure to 
lose if he keeps on violating the norm in the future.  
Let 21>t be the tax rate chosen by the tax setter, the worker’s best work response to 
this tax rate (see eq. (4)) and designate her Nash utility. B 
punishes A for imposing a tax rate that was above the social norm by choosing to work 
such that A gets revenues which are lower than expected in the current game 
and no higher than the revenues he would have got by respecting the social norm: 
)(tg
))(()()1()( tgCtgttW n −−=
)(te )(tg<
                                  )21()21(21)( nRgtte ≡≤                                                        (13) 
The worker obtains currently a lower utility by punishing 
than by playing Nash .  However, any 
punishment consistent with (13) forces the tax setter to respect the norm in the T remaining 
games in order to escape repeated losses. The worker expects from A’s compliance with 
the social norm a permanent utility level 
)))(()()1()(( teCtettW p −−= ))()(( tWtW pn >
)21(nW  which is higher than her Nash utility. 
“Equitable punishment” is chosen so as to maximize worker’s current utility under 
constraint (13). The punished A receives a revenue which is lower than what he expected 
to get by violating the norm, and no higher than what he would have obtained by 
complying with the social norm.  
)(tW p
Equitable punishment is effective only if B does not lose from punishing the norm’s 
violation: 
                               )()1()21()( tWTTWtW nnp +≥+ , 
or                            [ ] )()()()21( tWtWtWWT pnnn −≥− .                                       (14) 
This last condition states that the equitable punishment is a profitable private investment 
with a non-negative return. Punishment is made effective, and the social norm is respected, 
when the game is infinitely repeated but it is eventually violated when the number of 
repetitions is finite.  
As an alternative to equitable punishment, which is a cognitive (“cold”) response to norm 
violations, “revenge” is an affective (“hot”) drive, which hurts norm violators beyond what 
they would have got by respecting the norm. It usually occurs in cases of emergency and 
takes the form of a discrete, or even all-or-nothing, response. Instead of adopting their 
cognitive best response (i.e., ), workers who strongly feel that they have been )(tge =
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unfairly treated may simply adopt an emotional (impulsive) response (Zajonc 1980; Lévy-
Garboua, Meidinger and Rapoport 2004: section 8) and refuse to work (i.e., ) out of 
anger. The existence of such all-or-nothing responses is attested by the fact that responders 
commonly reject unfair proposals and accept fair proposals in one-shot ultimatum games. 
Revenge is prevalent in one-shot games but may also be present in finitely repeated games. 
Presumably, a fraction of workers will have an emotional response to norm violations and 
this fraction should increase with the distance to the social norm.  
0=e
 
Proposition 2: 
If taxpayers punish equitably tax setters who violated the social norm of 50% tax rate, the 
tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is just zero beyond the 50% threshold and the Laffer curve 
does not exist in the strict sense.14  
The average tax rate elasticity of tax revenue becomes negative, and a Laffer curve exists 
beyond the 50% threshold, if some workers punish norm violators out of revenge and other 
workers punish norm violators equitably. The maximum tax revenue is obtained for a 50% 
tax rate.   
Proof: 
If 21>
)()1()( eCettW p −−=
t , equitable workers would punish tax setters by choosing work so as to maximize 
s.t. )()21(0 max tet
Re
n
≡≤≤ . Since and)()(max tgte < 0>′′C , 
. Hence, equitable workers would punish norm violators by 
choosing . Since 
ttgCteC −=′<′ 1))(())(( max
)(max te )21()(max
nRtte ≡ , the violator always gets the same tax revenue that he 
would obtain by respecting the social norm of 50% tax rate and the tax rate elasticity of revenue is 
just equal to zero. Workers who respond emotionally to norm violations manifest an all-or-nothing 
response. Therefore, tax revenues are driven to zero and the tax rate elasticity of revenue becomes 
negative. □ 
 
It is worth noticing that our description of “equitable punishment” exactly confirms 
Adams’ (1963) “equity theory” (see also Akerlof and Yellen 1990). This result nicely 
relates fair taxes (wages) to a dynamic version of efficiency taxes (wages).   
So far, we have made a long way to show that revenue collection is maximized by a 
Leviathan state at the 50% tax rate, but we haven’t ruled out the possibility that the optimal 
tax rate be lower than 50%. This would happen if it pays a rational tax setter to be “kind” 
toward workers by setting the tax rate below the 50% norm. This is not the case, however. 
 
                                                           
14 We might also write that the Laffer curve exists in a degenerate form in the sense that tax revenue neither 
decreases nor increases when the tax rate is raised above 50%.  
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Proposition 3: 
Under the assumption that the exogenous tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is positive, it is 
not equitable for a tax setter to be kind toward the worker by setting the tax rate below the 
50% norm.  
Proof:  
Assume that 21<t and that worker B “rewards” the kind tax setter A by working more than it is 
optimal and enough to ensure that A gets no less revenue than )21(nR . That 
is, )()21()( min tet
Rte
n
≡≥ .  
(i) By the assumption that that exogenous tax rate elasticity of revenue is positive, 
<)(ttg )21(nR for all 21<t . Hence, .   )(min te )(tg>
(ii) If , worker B chooses the minimum effort level  that will reward the kind 
tax setter and reaches a suboptimal utility level while A gets the same tax revenue that he would 
obtain by respecting the social norm of 50% tax rate. Thus, B has no incentive to reward A’s 
kindness, and, knowing this, A has no incentive to be kind either. □ 
)(min te )(tg> )(min te
 
Although there will be no equitable reward to a kind tax setter who chose a tax rate which 
is below the 50% norm, some workers may feel gratitude toward their kind partner and 
wish to reward her at their own expense. Strong positive emotions are susceptible to 
trigger-off rewards in one-shot or finitely repeated games. However, it is very likely that 
that the absence of equitable reward will dominate in the aggregate and cause the average 
tax rate elasticity of revenue to be positive. Thus, tax revenue is very likely to increase 
with tax rate until it reaches the 50% social norm and stops increasing, or even decrease, at 
higher rates. The asymmetry of equitable rewards and punishments is responsible for a 
dynamic inversely U shaped Laffer curve. 
 
Proposition 4: 
If the elasticity of tax revenue to exogenous tax rates is positive for uniform tax rates below 
50%, an aggregate Laffer curve is very likely to exist and the maximum tax revenue is 
obtained at a 50% tax rate.  
We have ample evidence of punishment/reward strategies from our experimental setting. 
In figures 2a and 2b, we found that workers responded more strongly to endogenous tax 
changes than to exogenous ones. The observed gap between the mean responses in the two 
treatments indicates the amount of punishment and reward. Since equitable rewards have 
been ruled out (proposition 3), the observed rewards following a tax reduction must be 
driven by affect and thus appear to be large on figs. 2a and 2b. However, they are barely 
observed (tables 1 and 5). By contrast, a majority of punishments following norm’s 
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violations are driven by equity and this limits the average magnitude of observed 
punishments. However, affective punishments should be more frequent if workers face 
high work opportunities. Since affect-driven punishments often take the form of all-or-
nothing responses, we should observe that workers refuse to work more frequently after a 
norm’s violation in the high effort treatment than in the low effort treatment. Indeed, we 
can calculate from the bottom of table 4 that 16.9% refuse to work with a maximum of 52   
tasks vs. 11.0% with a maximum of 26 tasks.  
 
7. Conclusion: Implications for fiscal policy and the history of tax revolts 
 
              Our experiments show that a Laffer curve phenomenon cannot be observed when 
tax rates are randomly imposed on a working taxpayer, but arises in a Leviathan state 
condition in which a tax setter is given the power to maximize tax revenues to his own 
benefit (Brennan and Buchanan 1979, Buchanan 1979). Tax revenues are then maximized 
at a 50% tax rate. These results confirm Laffer’s conjecture that a Laffer curve would exist 
at a reasonable threshold, even if taxpayers had only one source of income. However, the 
reasons why a Laffer curve exists defy conventional economic wisdom but conform to 
basic political instinct.  
Our experimental findings suggest that, most of the time, fiscal changes will not produce a 
Laffer effect. Fiscal policies that serve macroeconomic purposes are likely to be perceived 
as exogenous changes by taxpayers. In order to produce a Laffer effect, fiscal policies need 
to be felt as intentional, discriminatory and especially hurtful by a group of taxpayers. The 
latter feel inequitably treated under such conditions, and those who feel it most strongly 
lose their temper and react emotionally to the breach of the implicit social norm. To be 
more specific, the workers who respond more emotionally to unfair taxation tend to be 
those endowed with higher work opportunities, and this is consistent with the history of tax 
revolts. The initiators of tax revolts are usually found among the most productive, high 
earning, and hard-working group of taxpayers.  
For instance, the quest for American independence grew as issues like taxation without 
representation in the British government angered the local population of the former British 
colonies. When the British decided to tax the colonists to pay a share of their expensive 
war against the French and Indians (1764-1767), the colonists were angry and rallied 
behind the phrase, “No Taxation without Representation”. The British were then forced to 
remove most of the unfair taxes (tax on sugar, Stamp Act, Townsend Act) that they had 
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been trying to enforce unilaterally. Two centuries later, the same scenario repeated in 
California as property taxes went out of control. Taxpayers were losing their home because 
they could not pay their property taxes, yet government maintained the burden. In the 
tradition of the American colonists, California taxpayers stood up and passed Proposition 
13 (1978) that reduced property taxes by about 57%. The tax revolt that swept the country 
had a worldwide impact.  
Our experiments demonstrate in a highly stylized fashion that the Laffer effect 
characterizes tax revolts, that is, an affective rejection of discriminatory and hurtful 
taxation. The Laffer curve phenomenon considerably exceeds the predictable outcome of a 
standard income-leisure tradeoff; and it even exceeds the magnitude of rational reactions to 
inequity.  
An important goal of our paper was to provide a rigorous micro-foundation for the Laffer 
curve. This new model uses simple tools of social choice theory to formulate prior 
intentions of players and endogenously generate a social norm of fair taxation at a 50% tax 
rate under asymmetric information about workers’ type. Taxpayers manage to enforce this 
norm by working less whenever it has been violated but do not systematically reward kind 
tax setters. Workers who maximize their expected wealth adjust work to the tax rate 
equitably so that tax revenues remain at a fair level. Remarkably, these workers conform to 
equity theory (Adams 1963), but only for disadvantageous inequity. Workers who respond 
affectively to norm violations just refuse to work so that tax revenues are cut down. The 
Laffer curve arises both from the asymmetry of equitable rewards and punishments and 
from the presence of a substantial share of emotional rejections of unfair taxation. 
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Appendix: Inequity aversion 
We reconsider the game under the assumption that both players are motivated by inequity 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). An individual is inequity averse if she would incur 
disutility both from being worse off in material terms than the other (disadvantageous 
inequity) and from being better off (advantageous inequity). We make here the plausible 
assumption that the first player, who has the power to tax, is at an advantage in this game. 
Thus the “social” revenue of a tax collector who suffers from advantageous inequity is 
([ )()1( eCetteteSR − )]−−−= β   ,                                                                      (1a) 
and the “social” utility of a worker who suffers even more from disadvantageous inequity 
is  
([ )()1()()1( eCetteeCetSW )]−−−−−−= α                                                     (2a) 
with βαβ ><≤ and,10 . 
Again, the solution of this game is solved by backward induction. The second player B 
chooses her social utility (SW) maximizing effort for a given tax rate, which yields the 
f.o.c. 
tteC α
α
+−−= 11)('  (3a) 
The labor supply curve is derived from (3a) and may be written  
e** = h(t),  (4a) 
In the second stage, the tax collector chooses her social revenue (SR) maximizing tax rate 
conditional on the labor supply schedule of the worker (4a), so that the f.o.c. is now for an 
interior optimum: 
( )[ ] ( ) 0)('1')(')(21 =−++− hChtthth tββ .                                                                     (5a) 
From (5a) and (3a), we derive the exact value of the tax rate elasticity of effort at an 
interior optimum: ≡tε
α
β
β
+−
−−=′
1
1
21
)(
)(
th
tht . The tax rate elasticity of tax revenue is equal 
to tε+1  if . The latter is always positive, except for (advantageous) inequity-neutral 
individuals (i.e.
0>t
0=β ) and for status seekers who like to be better off than their partner 
(i.e. 0<β ). Under the assumption: <0 21<β , the tax rate elasticity of tax revenue will lie 
between 0 and 1. With aeeC δ=)(  )1,0( >> aδ , it is possible to derive the equilibrium tax 
rate from (3a) and this elasticity’s value  
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1** β
β
α
α
−−+
−−
+
+=
a
at . 
This value is always smaller than the benchmark value
a
at 1* −= , if 21<β . Moreover, it is 
smaller than one-half iff β
βα
−
−+<
1
12a . When
2
1>β , the optimum is at a corner ( 0=t ): 
a tax setter who is strongly averse to advantageous inequity lets the worker capture the full 
benefits from her effort.  
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